Request ID: FOI-1666-2223 Date published: 08 November 2022
You asked
Please provide a summary of the incidents reported to TfL (from 01/01/22 to 13/10/22) whereby a train/tube/tram driver has fallen asleep while the vehicle was in motion. I would appreciate it if this summary could include:
1. The date of the incident
2. The location of the incident
3. The company involved
4. A short description as to what happened
5. Whether any action was taken against the driver as a result, and if so what was this action
6. Whether this incident caused any accidents, and if so what were the accidents
7. Please explain what measures were taken, if any, to prevent these types of incidents from happening again
We answered
Our Ref: FOI-1666-2223 Thank you for your request received on 12 October 2022 asking for information about train, Tube, and tram drivers that have fallen asleep whilst the vehicle was in motion. Your request has been considered in accordance with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and our information access policy. I can confirm we do hold the information you require. Safety continues to be TfL’s number one priority and we maintain a proactive approach to address fatigue management across all our operations. Fatigue management has become part of regular operational reviews, enabling sharing of best practice, immediate action and effective improvement. I can confirm that there have been no incidents of operators falling asleep whilst the vehicle was in motion on London Overground and Trams during the period of time you requested information for. Real-time accident prevention technology for drivers has been in operation on London Trams for a number of years and follows a recommendation from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) investigation following the Sandilands tram derailment in 2016. There has been one incident on the London Underground. On 12 March 2022, a train was delayed departing Ickenham for Hillingdon at approximately 00:40 as the result of the train having over-run the correct stopping mark in platform one by a distance of 50.6 metres. The over-run of the correct stopping mark by this distance resulted in the train passing platform one station starting signal A742, which was displaying a red aspect, without prior authority.
The investigation into this incident established the train over-ran the correct stopping mark because the train operator failed to initiate a service brake application in sufficient time to bring the train to a stand at the correct stopping mark at Ickenham platform one. This failure was found to be the result of the train operator falling asleep in the driving cab whilst operating the service between Ruislip and Ickenham. The train had both over-run the correct stopping mark at Ickenham platform one, and passed signal A742 without prior authority. The correct operational procedures were implemented following the incident and welfare checks undertaken with the train operator who was relieved from duty whilst further fact finding was undertaken. There was a delay associated with the incident but no injury or damage occurred as a result. In accordance with our obligations under Data Protection legislation, information on what action was taken against the driver has been withheld as required by section 40(2) of the FOI Act. This is because disclosure of this personal data would be a breach of the legislation, specifically the first principle of Article 5 of the UK General Data Protection Regulation which requires all processing of personal data to be fair and lawful. It would not be fair to disclose this personal information when the individuals have no expectation it would be disclosed and TfL has not satisfied one of the conditions which would make the processing ‘fair’. This exemption to the right of access to information is an absolute exemption and not subject to an assessment of whether the public interest favours use of the exemption. Instances such as these are extremely rare, and there are a number of preventative steps in place to mitigate future risks where fatigue might occur: • The robust integrity of the signalling system • Roster and duty design, including risk scoring • Fitness checks, at book on and while on duty (post incident) • Depot facilities • Cab ergonomics and guidance, for example posture and exercises • Human factors insights in training, e.g. the risks from ‘underload’ and suggested coping strategies • Encouragement to report fatigue incidents (and near misses) and a supportive approach to resolving any issues We have a fatigue reporting process across Customer Operations where staff can report to a manager if they are feeling fatigued. As part of this, there is guidance for managers and information is displayed in all operational areas which supported the launch of the electronic fatigue reporting form. Occurrences of fatigue reported via the form are centrally monitored by the Safety, Health, and Environment Fatigue Team. All of this is signposted in our internal online learning tools available to staff. In addition, fatigue reporting awareness has been incorporated into the safety system checks tools used by frontline managers. We have a range of resources and support to help all staff, but particularly those that work shift patterns. These include: • ‘Shiftwork Awareness’ employee guide • Fatigue and Shiftwork Awareness course • Staff are encouraged to use the sleep self-assessment questionnaire for a personalised report to help understand their sleep and sleep hygiene There is also a regular London Underground Fatigue Sub-group that is chaired by senior management held quarterly with the trade unions. If this is not the information you are looking for please feel free to contact me. Please see the attached information sheet for details of your right to appeal.
Yours sincerely
Gemma Jacob Senior FOI Case Officer FOI Case Management Team General Counsel Transport for London
